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RESISTING REGULATION WITH BLUE RIBBON
PANELS
Thomas O. McGarity *

I. INTRODUCTION
Modern health, safety, and environmental regulations rely heavily on
scientific information. Consequently, disputes over the reliability of
scientific studies, the proper interpretation of scientific data, and the
inferences that may appropriately be drawn from an existing body of
scientific information arise with great regularity as agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) go about their day-to-day business of implementing protective
regulatory statutes. 1 These disputes typically raise issues of such mindnumbing complexity that they are virtually incomprehensible to agency
decision makers who generally lack scientific training in the specific areas
of scientific knowledge that those disputes invoke. Decision makers must
therefore rely upon scientists who are familiar with the relevant research to
assess the quality of the scientific studies, interpret the scientific data, and
define the range of proper conclusions that can be drawn from the data. At
the same time, however, the existing body of scientific information is rarely
sufficient, by itself, to dictate a “scientifically correct” resolution of such
disputes, and regulatory decisions necessarily turn on both scientific
information and regulatory policy. 2 Regulatory decision makers therefore
face the daunting task of resolving scientific disputes, defining where the
science stops and where the policymaking begins, and determining the
content of the policy that must necessarily fill the gaps left by incomplete

*

Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS
207 (1990); WENDY WAGNER, RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (forthcoming 2006);
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade In Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1639-40 (1995).
2. Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
GEO. L.J. 729, 732-49 (1979); Wagner, supra note 1, at 1619.
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or inadequate scientific information.
One tried and true decision-making aid in this context is the “blue ribbon
panel,” which is composed of neutral experts charged with answering
specific questions that have been carefully crafted to limiting the panel’s
input to scientific issues while leaving the policymaking to agency decision
makers. 3 The relevant agency can either appoint the blue ribbon panel on
its own or contract with an outside body, like the National Research
Council of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS), to assemble the
panel and oversee its deliberations. In fact, Congress frequently requires
agencies to enter into such contracts with NAS to address especially
controversial scientific issues. 4 When such panels can achieve consensus,
their reports can be very useful to the agency, both for the information that
they provide, and for the legitimacy that they can lend to the agency’s
ultimate decision. Because the “blue ribbon panel” approach is timeconsuming and expensive, it is not appropriate for every regulatory action
involving science, but it is ideal for especially contentious scientific
disputes that otherwise tend to paralyze regulatory decision-making.
Because science plays such a prominent role in the regulatory process,
and because the science is invariably contestable, the entities that regularly
participate in that process have a strong incentive to present the existing
body of scientific information to the agency in a way that advances their
preferred regulatory outcomes. One way for a regulated entity to
accomplish this result is to assemble its own “blue ribbon panel,” populate
it with scientists who are likely to resolve disputes consistently with the
regulated entity’s preferred policies, charge the panel with questions that
encompass both science and policy, and subtly attempt to influence the
outcome of the panel’s deliberations. 5 The panel members are paid
generous honoraria or are hired as consultants, and they are flown, all
expenses paid, to commodious locations for their periodic meetings. 6 The
staff support that the regulated entity provides to the panel creates a built-in
mechanism by which it can shape the panel’s deliberations. Scientists from

3. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACHIEVING CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER: THE REPORT
BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OXEGENATES IN GASOLINE (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/fuels/oxypanel/r99021.pdf.
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d) (2000) (providing for referral of “questions of scientific fact”
by the hearing examiner to a committee of the National Academy of Sciences).
5. Although public interest groups have the same incentive to assemble blue ribbon
panels, they generally lack the resources to pay the scientists for their time and travel and to
provide staff support to such panels. Therefore, the technique has generally been employed
by regulated entities, rather than representatives of the beneficiaries of regulation.
6. See, e.g., ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH 109-10, 119 (2001) (noting
that an expert panelist for manufacturer of Fen-phen was paid $5000 per day plus expenses).
OF THE
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the regulated entities are made available to offer input and advice, but the
meetings are otherwise typically private affairs. 7
This Article will explore the use and abuse of “blue ribbon panels” by
regulated entities in regulatory decision-making involving contested
scientific issues. Part II of the Article will present a case study of one
company’s use of such a panel to avoid more stringent regulation of the
manufacture of the metal beryllium. Drawing on the beryllium case study
and other examples gleaned from news reports and the literature, Part III
will explore the implications of widespread use of this technique for fair
and effective health, safety, and environmental decision-making. Finally,
Part IV will offer some suggestions for how regulatory agencies should
approach industry-sponsored blue ribbon panels.
II. THE BERYLLIUM BLUE RIBBON PANEL
Beryllium is an extremely light, but exceedingly strong metal that is
used in a variety of consumer goods ranging from cell phones and golf
clubs to dental fixtures.8 Because the primary use for beryllium in its early
years was in the nuclear weapons industry, the history of its adverse effects
on human beings is clouded in secrecy. 9 For decades, the primary producer
of beryllium, the Brush Wellman Corporation, and the primary user of
beryllium, the federal defense agencies, attempted to belittle the health
risks that beryllium posed to workers and neighbors of beryllium plants.10
In their efforts to prevent OSHA and EPA from promulgating protective
regulations limiting human exposure to beryllium, they took every
opportunity to “manufacture uncertainty” about the science documenting
the fact that exposure to beryllium caused lung cancer and a debilitating
and usually fatal disease called chronic beryllium disease (CBD), or
berylliosis. 11 The primary vehicle that Brush Wellman employed for this
purpose was a blue ribbon panel called the Beryllium Industry Scientific

7. See, e.g., Neil Pearce, Adverse Reactions, Social Responses: A Tale of Two Asthma
Mortality Epidemics, in CONTESTED GROUND 57 (Peter Davis, ed. 1996) (noting that
members of expert panel hired by manufacturer of fenoterol assembled at Beverly Wilshire
Hotel in Beverly Hills for meeting).
8. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Safety and Health
Topics: Beryllium, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/beryllium/.
9. Sam Roe, Decades of Risk: U.S. Knowingly Allowed Workers to be Overexposed to
Toxic Dust, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Roe, Decades of
Risk].
10. Sam Roe, Lethal Exposure: Brush Mislead Workers, Regulators about Dangers,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 1, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Roe, Lethal Exposure].
11. David Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product, SCI. AM., June 2005, at 96; Roe, Decades
of Risk, supra note 9, at A1.
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Advisory Committee (BISAC).
A. Beryllium Manufacture During the Cold War
During World War II, the federal government entered into contracts with
Brush’s predecessor and other companies to provide beryllium to several
government-run laboratories associated with the Manhattan Project. 12 As
this massive effort proceeded ahead in complete secrecy, it became clear to
government health officials that some small proportion of the workers who
were exposed to beryllium dust in laboratories and fabrication plants were
suffering from a debilitating lung disease that resulted in shortness of
breath and ultimately death. 13 When the officials recommended that the
government take measures to reduce workplace exposures to beryllium, the
federal facilities and some of their private contractors began to supply
respirators to workers, but they took little additional action in the press to
develop the atomic bomb for the war effort.14
Soon after the war ended, however, a secret report circulating within the
newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) noted that the federal
government was “acutely interested in maintaining and expanding
production of beryllium.” 15 The report cautioned that if the incidence of
berylliosis in workers became known outside the defense establishment, the
outbreak “might be headlined, particularly in non-friendly papers, for
weeks and months,” and this might in turn “seriously embarrass the AEC
and reduce public confidence in the organization.”16 Rather than risk that
embarrassment and a potential reduction in beryllium supplies, the AEC
and its contractors decided to keep the incidence of berylliosis under
wraps. 17
After a 1943 outbreak of berylliosis among workers and neighbors of a
beryllium plant in Lorain, Ohio threatened precisely the public relations
fiasco that the AEC feared, it took steps to reduce exposures to beryllium at
beryllium processing and weapons manufacturing plants throughout the
country. 18 AEC scientists determined that neighbors should be exposed to
no more than 0.01 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) in the ambient air,
a number that became the very first federal ambient air quality standard

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 9, at A1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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years before the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970. 19 A workplace
exposure standard was more difficult to promulgate, because it would have
been impossible to limit exposures in some workplaces to 0.01 µg/m3 at a
cost that government and industry officials were willing to pay at the
time. 20 The federal workplace limit of 2.0 µg/m3, established in 1949,
grew out of a taxicab conversation between an AEC scientist and a medical
consultant. 21 That standard remains in place to this day. 22
For the next twenty-five years, the original standards were enforced not
through regulations backed up by civil and criminal penalties, but through
clauses in the contracts between AEC and its successor agency, the
Department of Energy (DOE), and the private government contractors.23
This posed a clear institutional conflict of interest, because the AEC and
DOE were also responsible for ensuring a continuing supply of beryllium
for the nuclear weapons arsenal. 24 Indeed, the very same official was in
charge of purchasing beryllium for the AEC and for enforcing the safety
provisions in the purchase contracts. 25 While this official faced very little
pressure from uninformed workers and neighbors to ensure that the
standards were not exceeded, he faced enormous pressure from the military
to keep the beryllium supplies flowing. When the AEC threatened during
the 1960s to cancel one contract because of safety violations, a general
called the relevant agency official to ask: “What are you, out of your
goddamn-picking mind? I’ve got submarines out there. We need
missiles.” 26 The official soon left the agency to become a top executive at
Brush Wellman. 27
B. Beryllium Risks to Workers
Although the government had established a 2.0 µg/m3 limit for worker
exposure to beryllium, workers were routinely exposed to levels exceeding
100 µg/m3 during the 1950s. 28 The owner of the primary manufacturing
plant at the time, the Brush Beryllium Company, recognized that the

19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98; Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 9, at A1.
22. The DOE issued a new role, reducing the acceptable workplace exposure level by a
factor of ten. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98.
23. Roe, Decades of Risk, supra note 9, at A1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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company was imposing health risks on its workers and that this could give
rise to legal liability if the workers ever learned of those risks. 29 A
government document from the 1950s noted that Brush Beryllium
Company attorneys were “in agreement that should negligence suits be
brought against Brush in the future, the company would be in a very
vulnerable position because it could be pointed out that evidence of
overexposure was available and no direct action was taken to lower the
exposures.” 30
As the old beryllium plants were closed and replaced during the 1960s,
the newer plants were designed to keep workplace exposures below the 2.0
µg/m3 level, though this was not always accomplished. 31 By the mid1970s, however, evidence began to accumulate that beryllium causes lung
cancer in human beings. 32 Since there is no safe level of exposure to a
carcinogen, the most effective way to protect workers is to set the standard
as low as possible to reduce the cancer risk. Additional controls, however,
would have entailed large costs, and the industry therefore strongly resisted
both the characterization of beryllium as a human carcinogen and attempts
by OSHA and DOE to reduce allowable exposure levels.
C. OSHA Attempts to Set A Protective Standard.
On October 14, 1975, OSHA proposed to promulgate a federal
occupational health standard for beryllium that would reduce the existing
standard of 2.0 µg/m3 to 1.0 µg/m3. 33 OSHA based the proposal on its
determinations that at least a dozen workers per year were being diagnosed
with berylliosis and that beryllium had been shown to cause cancer in
laboratory animals.34 It also relied on three controversial studies
concluding that beryllium exposures caused cancer in workers at beryllium
production plants. 35 A criteria document prepared by OSHA’s sister
agency, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), provided scientific support for OSHA’s rulemaking. 36
The proposed rule took Brush Wellman officials completely by surprise,
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Occupational Exposure to Beryllium; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg.
48,814, 48,817 (Oct. 17, 1975) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
33. Id. at 48,814.
34. Id. at 48,816, 48,818.
35. Id.; see also Testimony of Edward U. Baier, Deputy Dir., Nat’l Inst. for
Occupational Safety & Health, Ctr. for Disease Control, before the Occupational Safety &
Health Admin. 3-4 (Aug. 19, 1977) (on file with author) [hereinafter Baier Testimony].
36. Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4.
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and they were not pleased. Given the company’s close relationship with
the Department of Energy (the entity now responsible for managing nuclear
weapons contractors), they expected more advance notice. The CEO of
Brush Wellman told his lawyers that he was determined to fight the rule
“with every weapon we had,” and he expected it to be the top priority both
for his company and for the law firm that it hired. 37 The company and its
lawyers would challenge the legal basis for the proposal, but it would also
attack the science underlying the agency’s conclusions and apply other
“informal pressures” through its allies in Congress and the
Administration. 38
The rulemaking process culminated in a three-week formal hearing
before a panel of OSHA officials in which attorneys from the agency, the
company, and labor unions presented experts to testify and be crossexamined on relevant scientific and engineering issues. 39 A witness for
NIOSH testified that the evidence of beryllium’s carcinogenicity justified
increasing the stringency of the standard to ensure that workers received
the lowest feasible exposures. 40 In the witness’s opinion, “[p]robably no
compounds known to man give so consistent a carcinogenic response in so
many animal species as do the compounds of beryllium.” 41 Moreover, the
fact that beryllium caused cancer at relatively low exposure levels in
laboratory animals meant that beryllium compounds were “considered to be
among the most potent carcinogens that have ever been tested in animals.42
The NIOSH witness also relied upon human epidemiological studies
conducted over several years by Dr. Thomas Mancuso and his colleagues
and on a very recently completed study undertaken for NIOSH by David L.
Bayliss and Joseph K. Wagoner, a special assistant to the Director of
NIOSH. 43 Relying on “the cumulative evidence presented,” NIOSH
recommended that “beryllium be classified as a carcinogen.” 44 Since “no
safe level has yet been demonstrated for a carcinogen,” NIOSH
recommended that “beryllium be controlled as low as possible in the
industrial setting so as to materially reduce the risk of cancer.”45
To make its case on the scientific issues, Brush Wellman hired an
37. Sam Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1999, at A1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Deborah Shapley, Occupational Cancer: Government Challenged in Beryllium
Proceeding, 198 SCIENCE 898, 898 (1977); Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3.
43. Baier Testimony, supra note 35, at 3-4.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
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impressive array of witnesses, including Dr. Merril Eisenbud, a professor at
New York University School of Medicine, and Dr. Brian MacMahon, a
well-known epidemiologist at the Harvard School of Public Health. They
argued that the animal studies were by and large irrelevant, because they
did not use the form of beryllium (beryllium copper) to which seventy
percent of the workers were exposed. 46 They were extremely critical of the
epidemiological studies because an earlier version of the Bayliss and
Wagoner study had found no increase in the incidence of lung cancer and
because the more recent version of the study suffered from what they
believed to be several serious flaws.47
A careful examination of the underlying data undertaken by industry
consultants did reveal some information that tended to undermine the
NIOSH authors’ conclusions. In particular, thirty of the forty-six
employees who died of lung cancer had been working at the beryllium
plant for less than one year. In the minds of the industry consultants, this
was too brief an exposure to yield a credible conclusion concerning the
capacity of beryllium to cause cancer in humans. 48 This was particularly
evident in one of the lung cancer victims who was hired and terminated on
the same day. 49 They also criticized the authors’ failure to correct for age
and smoking habits, two potentially serious confounding factors. 50
D. The Industry Reacts
Concluding that it was unlikely to prevail on the merits in the formal
regulatory proceedings, Brush Wellman decided “that the only chance we
had was to indict the government for bad faith.” 51 A Brush spokesperson
therefore charged that NIOSH had concealed information, abused its
power, and generally treated the industry like “the enemy.” 52 Through its
public relations company, Brush convened a panel of eight scientists, six of
whom were past or present company consultants, 53 at the Cosmos Club in
Washington, D.C. and asked them to draft a critique of the cancer studies
upon which NIOSH and OSHA were relying. 54 In an open letter to the
46. Shapley, supra note 42, at 898.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 899.
49. Id. at 901.
50. Id. at 899.
51. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
52. Id.
53. Letter from Joseph Odorcich, Vice President, Safety & Health Dep’t, et al. to Joseph
A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare and Hon. F. Ray Marshall, Sec’y of
Labor 1 (Mar. 20, 1978) (on file with author).
54. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
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Secretaries of Labor and Health Education and Welfare (HEW), the
scientists characterized the studies as “shocking examples of the shoddy
scholarship and questionable objectivity utilized in making important
national regulatory decisions.” 55 The letter, which the public relations firm
also sent to reporters and members of Congress, did not identify any of the
authors as consultants for the beryllium industry and therefore did nothing
to dispel the impression that it had been spontaneously generated by the
outraged scientists. 56
Two weeks after the scientists’ letter went out, Brush Wellman attached
it to a letter to the Associate Director for Regulatory Policy and
Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) urging him
to “take appropriate action to correct this shocking exhibition of
misconduct on the part of Federal regulators” and demanding that OMB
“prevent any precipitous action by OSHA until this matter has been
thoroughly reviewed and resolved.” 57 At roughly the same time, OSHA
received letters from prominent senators and congresspersons demanding,
among other things, a “truly independent review” of the science underlying
OSHA’s position on beryllium’s carcinogenicity. 58
The public relations assault had its intended effect. Although the
rulemaking record was complete, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
OSHA, Eula Bingham, wrote to HEW’s Assistant Secretary for Health,
Donald Millar, to request that he convene a “group of senior governmental
scientists to review all the epidemiological, clinical, and experimental data
and provide us with an assessment that will help us resolve the issues” that
the industry consultants had raised.59 In her response to the letter written
by the Cosmos Club group of scientists, she promised to “hold in abeyance
the issuance of a final beryllium standard until we have received”
comments from the government scientists. 60
Thus, the government responded to the industry-appointed blue ribbon
55. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. Med. Ctr., et
al. to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare and Hon. F. Ray Marshall,
Sec’y of Labor 1 (Feb. 10, 1978) (on file with author).
56. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
57. Letter from Martin B. Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Wayne
Grandquist, Assoc. Dir. for Regulatory Policy & Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 2 (Feb.
24, 1978) (on file with author).
58. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1; Letter from Orrin G. Hatch,
United States Senate to Hon. F. Ray Marshall, Sec’y of Labor 1 (Mar. 21, 1978) (on file
with author).
59. Letter from Eula Bingham, Assistant Sec’y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin.
to Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec’y for Health, Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare 1 (Mar.
8, 1978) (on file with author).
60. Id.
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panel of private sector scientists by proposing to empanel a blue ribbon
panel of government scientists. This solution was totally unacceptable to
the industry, which objected to any “review being conducted by
governmental scientists at the direction of the Department within which the
studies were originally conducted.” 61 The industry was understandably
concerned that a blue ribbon panel composed of government scientists
would lack sufficient objectivity. It did not comment on the objectivity of
the blue ribbon panel that it had convened at the Cosmos Club.
With matters at an impasse, the leader of the Cosmos Club group, Dr.
Merril Eisenbud, met with Dr. Millar to urge him to take the issue of
beryllium’s carcinogenicity away from government officials and lawyers
and give it to the scientists from both government and industry. Dr.
Eisenbud suggested that “the main issues could be resolved during a oneday conference if the lawyers would stay on the sidelines.” 62 He argued
that “[t]he decisions should be reached by the scientific and technical
representatives and the role of the lawyers should be limited to translating
the decisions into the simplest possible memorandum of understanding that
could serve as the basis for the OSHA standard.” 63 He urged Millar to
meet with a Brush Wellman vice-president to discuss co-sponsoring such a
scientific meeting. 64
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) had not played a significant
role in the OSHA hearings, it became very interested in the outcome of the
OSHA effort when DOD officials learned that one of the two national
suppliers of beryllium, Brush Wellman’s competitor Kawecki Berylco
Industries, might quit making beryllium, rather than comply with stringent
OSHA standards. 65 A special DOD task force concluded that a decision by
both companies to cease beryllium production would have serious national
security implications.66 The government could, of course, pay for the
improvements necessary to meet the OSHA standards through its contracts
with the companies, but that would cost tens of millions of dollars, and the
Department of Defense did not want to include that expense in its budget.67

61. Letter from Patrick F. McCartan, Cousel for Brush Wellman, Inc. to Eula Bingham,
Assistant Sec’y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 1 (Mar. 22, 1978) (on file with
author).
62. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. to Dr. J.
Donald Millar, Dir., Bureau of State Servs., Ctr. for Disease Control 1 (May 26, 1978) (on
file with author).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Instead, the task force asked the Secretary of Energy to attempt to
“moderate” the OSHA proposal. 68
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger then wrote to Secretary of Labor
Ray Marshall and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph
Califano to bring to their attention the fact that, “[t]he loss of beryllium
production capability would seriously impact our ability to develop and
produce weapons for the nuclear stockpile and, consequently, adversely
affect our national security.” 69 Because “significant questions have been
raised within the scientific community concerning the quality and adequacy
of the data on which change of the standard is presently based,” DOE
demanded an “independent peer review” of all available data on the effects
of beryllium to address the adequacy of the present standard before issuing
the proposed new standard.” 70 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sent a
similar letter to Marshall.71
Accepting Schlesinger’s recommendation, Secretary Califano then wrote
the head of the Cosmos Club group, Dr. Merril Eisenbud, to tell him that
that HEW would appoint “an outside group of scientists to review the
experimental and epidemiological evidence.”72 One of the other members
of the Cosmos Club group wrote to Brush Wellman’s vice-president to
congratulate him on this coup, noting that “Califano’s letter does [make it]
look as if you have indeed stirred up a proper re-approach to the subject,
especially with the appointment of an outside group of scientists to review
things.” 73
To Brush Wellman’s chagrin, the panel, which was chaired by
University of North Carolina epidemiologist Dr. Carl Shy, found the
science underlying the proposal to be of sufficient quality to justify
regulatory action. 74 The panel found that the existing animal studies were
“credible in showing carcinogenicity of beryllium in at least two species”
and that “the epidemiological evidence is suggestive that beryllium is a

68. Id.
69. Letter from James R. Schlesinger, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy to Hon. F. Ray Marshall,
Sec’y of Labor 1 (Aug. 30, 1978) (on file with author).
70. Id.
71. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
72. Letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare to Dr. Merril
Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. 1 (Aug. 30, 1978) (on file with author).
73. Letter from Dr. H.S. VanOrdstrand, Dep’t of Pulmonary Disease to Martin B.
Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. 1 (Sept. 6, 1978) (on file with author).
74. Letter from Dr. Carl M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina Med.
Sch. to Dr. William H. Foege, Dir., Ctr. for Disease Control 1 (Oct. 12, 1978) (on file with
author).
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carcinogen in man.” 75 The evidence was only “suggestive” because
“alternative explanations for the positive findings” had not been
definitively excluded and because the three recent papers that most
indicated carcinogenicity still required “some revisions after journal peer
review prior to publication.” 76 Nevertheless, “it would be imprudent from
a public health perspective to delay our judgment about beryllium exposure
of current workers, until these studies were completed.” 77
The letter precipitated a flurry of responses from members of the
Cosmos Club group. To a letter from Merril Eisenbud, Shy was
deferential, but unrepentant. 78 Like Eisenbud, Shy was troubled by the fact
that workers exposed for less than a year appeared to suffer cancer at a
greater frequency than those who had been exposed for four years or
more. 79 Eisenbud’s letter had, however, helped clarify the matter by
pointing out that many of the short-term exposure cancer victims had been
exposed to the highest levels of beryllium during the uncontrolled period of
the 1940’s. 80 Some or all of these workers may have worked for only short
periods because the high exposures made them acutely ill. 81
In his letter to Dr. Shy, Cosmos Club group member Brian MacMahon
was charitable toward the committee’s report, but warned that the
committee may have been duped by the Bayliss-Wagoner paper. 82 Dr.
MacMahon wrote that Shy’s comments on the paper “were reasonable
enough but if you had any concept of the skullduggery that has gone on in
the historical development of this paper I do not believe that you would
have any confidence that the findings as now presented are reasonably
error-free or that they result from an objective effort to ascertain the
facts.” 83
Dr. MacMahon’s innuendo was at least partially validated more than a
year later when a dispute erupted between the authors of the Bayliss-

75. Id. at 1-2.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Letter from Dr Dr. Carl M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina
Med. Sch. to Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. 1 (Nov. 17, 1978)
(on file with author).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Letter from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv. Univ. to Dr. Carl
M. Shy, Prof. of Epidemiology, Univ. of North Carolina Med. Sch. 1 (Feb. 13, 1979) (on
file with author).
83. Id.
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Wagoner paper. 84 By the time that the study was published in the Journal
of Environmental Research, its preparation had effectively been taken over
by Wagoner and OSHA scientist Dr. Peter Infante. 85 David Bayliss, who
had worked on the study as a NIOSH employee but was by that time
employed by the EPA, wrote to the head of the Centers for Disease Control
on November 12, 1980, to complain that the final version of the study had
been published without his approval or permission, despite the fact that he
was listed as a co-author. 86 Bayliss complained that the paper contained
“several serious shortcomings” that other scientists had called to the
authors’ attention but had not been corrected. 87 Bayliss alleged that as Dr.
Wagoner (his superior at NIOSH) became more involved in the preparation
of the paper, it seemed increasingly “motivated . . . by a desire to provide
evidence in support of the proposed OSHA standard and of the position
advanced by OSHA that beryllium should be treated as a human
carcinogen.” 88 Bayliss believed that “there is now in the public domain a
report attributed in part to me and bearing the apparent imprimatur of
agencies of the United States government, which is at best misleading and
by even the lowest common denominator of scientific standards should not
be permitted to stand unchallenged in its present form.” 89
The beryllium industry was delighted to hear that Bayliss had
disassociated himself from the paper, and it made sure that the Bayliss
letter was heavily publicized. 90 NIOSH officials, however, stood by the
study as published and noted that it remained validated by the positive
animal studies. 91 In a letter to noted British epidemiologist Sir Richard
Doll, New York University epidemiologist Norton Nelson said he believed
some of Bayliss’ allegations, but had concluded that “the basic findings
survive, leading to (generally) a conclusion of significant increases in lung
cancer.” 92
As the scientific controversy was brewing, the new owner of Kawecki

84. Letter from David L. Bayliss, Carcinogen Assessment Group, Envtl. Prot. Agency to
Dr. William H. Foege, Dir., Ctr. for Disease Control 1 (Nov. 12, 1980) (on file with
author).
85. Id. at 1-2.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 5.
90. R. Jeffrey Smith, Beryllium Report Disputed by Listed Author, 211 SCIENCE 556,
556-57 (1981).
91. Id. at 556.
92. Letter from Norton Nelson, Prof., New York Univ. Med. Ctr. to Sir Richard Doll,
M.D., Prof., Green College (Jan. 12, 1981) (on file with author).
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Berylco decided to get out of the beryllium production business even
without the impetus of a new OSHA standard. 93 This left Brush
Wellman as the government’s only domestic supplier of beryllium.94
Operating from this very strong negotiating position, Brush Wellman
entered into an agreement with the DOE under which it received a thirtyfive percent increase in the price that it charged for beryllium. The DOE
agreed not to work with other companies to develop an alternative
supply of beryllium, and it promised to “exert its best efforts to convince
OSHA to revise its proposed beryllium standard.” 95
Although the negotiations took place at very high levels in the
government, Dr. Bingham (the OSHA director) later recalled that the
Department of Labor “got the message that the Department of Defense and
Energy indicated that what was going forward caused a problem with
national defense.” 96 To Bingham’s great disappointment, the Department
of Labor in 1979 acceded to pressure from DOE and DOD and put the
beryllium proposal on the back burner, 97 where it has remained until this
day. Brush Wellman continued to produce beryllium at its aging plant
where workers were frequently exposed to levels of beryllium that
exceeded even the less stringent 2.0 µg/m3 OSHA standard.98
E. The Oxford Conference
Although the OSHA threat disappeared, the scientific controversy did
not. The industry still faced the serious possibility that private and
international standard-setting agencies would act on the accumulating
scientific studies indicating that beryllium was a human carcinogen and
that the aging 2.0 µg/m3 standard was not preventing workers from
contracting berylliosis. Not all of the processes that Brush Wellman
employed were capable of meeting the 2 µg/m3 standard on a continuing
basis, and scientists were increasingly expressing their doubts that the
standard was stringent enough in any event. 99 If beryllium caused cancer,
then a 2.0 µg/m3 standard was clearly not adequate to protect workers, and

93. Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
94. Id.
95. Proposal of Brush Wellman Inc. for Upgrading of Beryllium Metal Plant at Elmore,
Ohio (1981) (on file with author); Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
96. Enric Volante & Rhonda Bodfield Sander, Protection for Workers Stymied by Firm,
Allies, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 9, 1999, at A1.
97. Id.; Roe, Death of a Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
98. Roe, Death of a Safety Safety Plan, supra note 37, at A1.
99. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Jere
Brophy et al., Beryllium Supply to the Government 1 (Mar. 12, 1992) (on file with author).
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the neighbors of beryllium plants were also at risk of contracting lung
cancer. Worst of all, once former workers, neighbors, and consumers of
beryllium-containing products got wind of the fact that beryllium caused
cancer, the company could expect “widespread litigation,” that would, in
the words of a company attorney, lead to “a modern day gold rush.” 100
Brush Wellman consultants therefore continued to closely monitor
scientific developments involving beryllium. In mid-1983, Dr. Brian
MacMahon attended a conference at Oxford University hosted by
preeminent epidemiologist Dr. Richard Doll. Dr. MacMahon related to
Brush Wellman that Gary Flamm of the FDA presented a paper on the
animal evidence of beryllium carcinogenicity that, in MacMahon’s view,
indicated “[w]ithout a doubt [that] it is the most powerful metallic cause of
cancer.” 101 Dr. MacMahon further reported that a scientist from the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), an international
standard-setting body associated with the World Health Organization,
delivered a paper on the epidemiology of beryllium in which he concluded
that “the single most likely explanation of the observations was that
beryllium is carcinogenic in man,” though there were, of course, “other
MacMahon himself provided background on the
explanations.” 102
Wagoner study (no longer associated with Bayliss), and he told the
conference that NIOSH had concluded that the studies should be redone.103
This almost produced an agreement to take beryllium off the meeting
agenda altogether, but Dr. Doll “did not wish to go so far.” 104 Instead, the
participants agreed that any statement about beryllium would be “followed
by a statement that because of the uncertainty as to the reliability of the
epidemiologic data, the symposium did not wish to take a position relating
to the epidemiologic evidence on beryllium.” 105 Although the proceedings
were supposed to be kept confidential until the formal papers were
published, Dr. MacMahon could “see no particular reason” not to relate
them to Brush Wellman’s vice-president, “[j]ust so [he didn’t] write to
Richard Doll about it!” 106 Brush Wellman’s interests were thus well
served by Dr. MacMahon’s presence at the meeting.

100. Roe, Lethal Exposure, supra note 10, at A1.
101. Letter from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv. Univ. to Martin B.
Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. (July 13, 1983) (on file with author).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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F. Challenging EPA’s Health Effects Document
In the mid-1980s, a new agency entered the regulatory fray. The
Environmental Protection Agency prepared a health effects document for
beryllium for the purpose of promulgating a hazardous emissions standard
for companies, like Brush Wellman, that discharged beryllium compounds
into the ambient air.107 Brush Wellman hired Neil Roth of Roth Associates
to help coordinate the company’s response to EPA’s beryllium risk
assessment. 108 In early 1985, Roth reported that the document would be
reviewed by a seven-member scientific panel assembled by EPA’s Science
Advisory Board (SAB), and that the company would have a “receptive ear”
in one of the members, Ron Wyzga, who worked for the power industryfunded Electric Power Research Institute.109
In anticipation of a panel meeting in early June, Dr. MacMahon wrote to
the Executive Secretary of the Environmental Health Committee of the
SAB to express his views on the Draft Health Assessment Document.110
He believed that the section was “comprehensive, clear, well written and
generally accurate,” except for the document’s reliance on the Wagoner
His problem was not that the data were
epidemiology study. 111
“controversial,” but rather that they were “clearly wrong.” 112 A second
epidemiological study by Dr. Thomas Mancuso was afflicted by the same
errors and uncertainties, but had been “less fully explored because of the
investigator’s unwillingness to release [the underlying data].” 113 Dr.
MacMahon concluded that, “[i]n light of these errors and uncertainties, to
base a human risk assessment on either of these two sets of data is, in my
view, scientific malpractice—in the sense in which that term is used in
clinical medicine.” 114 Nowhere in the letter did MacMahon mention that
he was a long-time paid consultant for Brush Wellman. 115
In June 1985, Roth reported on conversations that he had with several

107. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR
BERYLLIUM (1987).
108. See Memorandum from Neil Roth, Roth Associates, Inc. to Tom Concannon et al.,
Upcoming Beryllium Hearing 1 (Feb. 7, 1985) (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. Letter from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv. Univ. to Dr. Daniel
M. Byrd III, Executive Sec’y, Envtl. Health Comm. Sci. Advisory Bd., U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency 1 (May 22, 1985) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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EPA employees subsequent to the SAB panel meeting. 116 David Bayliss,
who now worked for EPA’s carcinogen assessment group (CAG), reported
to Roth that the panel had endorsed the document. 117 The CAG planned to
perform some additional calculations using different latency periods and
thereafter finalize the document. 118 It did not plan to address MacMahon’s
criticisms in any comprehensive way. 119 Ron Wyzga, the industry ally on
the panel, was surprised to hear from Roth of CAG’s response, and he
agreed to submit “specific recommendations on what he expects from
them.” 120 Roth reported that as a result of his efforts, “[a]t a minimum
Ron’s comments will force them to obtain and process the latest NIOSH
life table program or ask us to do it. Knowing Dave Bayliss, this will take
him years to do.” 121
As Roth predicted, in September of 1985, the SAB advised the
Administrator of EPA that “the draft document merits revision on several
critical points.” 122 The Committee agreed with CAG that beryllium was “a
carcinogen for animal species,” but asserted that the animal studies that
were appropriate for quantitative risk assessment purposes “lead to
estimates which are inconsistent with the expectations from human
epidemiological studies.” 123 As for the epidemiological studies, the
document demonstrated a “thorough understanding of the problems and
questions embedded in these data,” but “[m]any of the confounding factors
that the draft document discusses have quantitative implications that have
not been made explicit in the risk calculations.”124 The agency staff should
therefore “calculate the quantitative implications of these confounding
factors.” 125 This was, of course, exactly the reaction that Roth had
predicted. 126
By communicating his conversation with CAG member Bayliss to panel
member Wyzga, industry consultant Roth ensured that CAG would not be

116. Memorandum from Neil Roth, Roth Associates, Inc. to J. Butler et al., Revisions to
EPA Beryllium Document 1 (June 11, 1985) (on file with author).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Letter from Richard A. Griesemer, Chair, Envtl. Health Comm. and Norton Nelson,
Prof., New York Univ. Med. Ctr. to Hon. Lee M. Thomas, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
1 (Sept. 23, 1985) (on file with author).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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able to disregard the critique of industry consultant MacMahon, thereby
ensuring that a final version of the Health Assessment Document (and any
subsequently promulgated regulatory requirements) would not be
forthcoming for years.
G. The BISAC
At a two-day meeting in 1986, Brush Wellman officials hit upon a plan
to shape the evolving science to fit the company’s benign view of the
hazards that beryllium posed to workers. 127 One critical component of that
plan was to formalize the Cosmos Club group into an entity called the
Beryllium Industry Scientific Advisory Committee (BISAC). 128 Like the
Cosmos Club group, BISAC was chaired by Dr. Merril Eisenbud, and it
included the most active members of the Cosmos Club, Dr. Brian
MacMahon and Dr. Adrianne Rogers, a colleague of Dr. MacMahon at the
Harvard School of Public Health. 129 The final scientist to join BISAC was
Dr. Paul Kotin, a well-known toxicologist who had been the first director
of the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences and was later
the senior medical officer for the Johns Manville Corporation, a prominent
United States manufacturer of asbestos products.130 Dr. Thomas Markham,
Brush Wellman’s medical director, rounded out the five-member
committee.
Its Executive Director was long-time Brush Wellman
occupational health specialist Martin Powers. 131
The reconstituted committee held its inaugural meeting on October 8,
1990 at the Cosmos Club, 132 and it met at least twice a year thereafter. The
members were paid two thousand dollars each, plus travel expenses,133 but
individual members also served as consultants to Brush Wellman. Over the
next decade Brush Wellmon contributed more than one million dollars to
support BISAC’s activities. 134 According to its charter, one of the
purposes of the committee was to “develop and implement a strategy to
address . . . the perception of beryllium as a human carcinogen.”135 An
127. Sam Roe, Thought Control: Brush Devised Strategy to Shape Knowledge,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Roe, Thought Control].
128. Id.
129. Letter from Martin B. Powers, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Tom Hall,
Consumer Affairs Office, Dep’t of Labor 1 (Sept. 16, 1977) (on file with author).
130. Roe, Thought Control, supra note 127, at A1.
131. Minutes of Beryllium Industry Scientific Advisory Committee (BISAC) Meeting 1
(Oct. 8, 1990) (on file with author).
132. Id.
133. Roe, Thought Control, supra note 127, at A1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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internal company document suggested that the committee would “provide
the scientific basis for our cancer strategy.” 136 Two other issues also
dominated BISAC’s deliberations: (1) the curious resurgence of Chronic
Beryllium Disease (CBD) at Brush Wellman plants years after Brush
Wellman scientists had concluded that the 2.0 µg/m3 standard had all but
eradicated the disease; and (2) the intriguing possibility of reducing the
incidence of CBD by screening susceptible workers out of the workplace
through genetic testing.
1. Testing for CBD
At its July 1991 meeting, BISAC agreed to convene a workshop aimed
at standardizing protocols for a more sensitive probe for berylliosis called
LTT testing. 137 Later that year, the committee met with representatives of
the DOE and other beryllium users, and they agreed “that two meetings
were in order.” 138 The first would be a workshop “to quickly develop
protocols for testing, analysis and follow-up,” and the second would be “a
more comprehensive conference . . . to assess the meaning of the data
generated and the efficacy of the programs to that date.” 139 The workshop,
which was held in February of 1992 in Washington, D.C., 140 was attended
by representatives of the relevant government agencies, the beryllium
industry, the United Steelworkers Union, and one nonprofit worker
advocacy group. 141 Although the participants discussed the pros and cons
of establishing a “national database for the consolidation of all beryllium
LTT,” the group did not reach a consensus on that question.142 The
industry representatives were concerned that DOE’s screening efforts were
“proceeding at a pace that could be summarized as ‘too much, too fast,’”
but the representatives of the labor unions disputed this characterization.143
At the next BISAC meeting, the committee concluded that DOE was not
likely to heed industry concerns that the LTT testing program was “too
ambitious in both scope and speed of execution.” 144
Given that the LTT screening was likely to go forward despite its
136. Id.
137. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 1-2 (July 25, 1991) (on file with author).
138. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (Oct. 16-17, 1991) (on file with author).
139. Id.
140. Minutes of Joint U.S. Dep’t of Energy and Beryllium Industry Scientific Advisory
Comm. Workshop Meeting on Lymphocyte Transformation Testing of Beryllium Workers 1
(Feb. 3-4, 1992) (on file with author).
141. Id. at Attachment II.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Id. at 5.
144. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 1 (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with author).
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reservations, BISAC provided its input on what information from the
screening program should be communicated to Brush Wellman
employees. 145 Early reports from one hundred seventy-two employees that
had been tested at one of Brush Wellman’s plant indicated that five of the
tests were abnormal and four were considered “borderline.”146 At the other
plant, eight of one hundred forty-four were abnormal and five were
borderline. 147 Of the eight abnormal tests at the first plant, three cases had
been confirmed and five were being re-tested. 148 Although the abnormal
and borderline cases were of sufficient importance, the committee was
interested in the breakdown, and the members agreed that “in order to
avoid undue anxiety on the part of the employee, employee notification
should be confined to confirmed cases.” 149
By July of 1992, the National Institute for Environmental and Health
Science (NIEHS) had agreed to join BISAC and the DOE in sponsoring the
suggested international conference, but it was not clear that it would be
limited to CBD. 150 In a letter to his counterpart at DOE, the BISAC
Chairman strongly recommended that the conference not take up the
question of the carcinogenicity of beryllium. 151 By January of 1993,
however, a tentative agenda for the meeting indicated that the entire second
day would be devoted to carcinogenicity-related issues. 152 BISAC then
concluded that it would not sponsor the meeting after all.153
2. The Genetics of CBD
BISAC understood that “[i]f techniques could be developed to determine
whether an individual is predisposed to CBD it might be possible to
prevent the disease by pre-employment screening.” 154 The committee
therefore supported the work of Italian scientist Cesare Saltini, who also
did work at Johns Hopkins University. In early 1991, BISAC decided to
devote fifty thousand dollars to Saltini’s work. 155 Brush Wellman’s 1991
145. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (July 8, 1993) (on file with author).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. to Paul F.
Wembach 1 (July 13, 1992) (on file with author).
151. Id. at 2.
152. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. to BISAC,
Attachment (Jan. 30, 1993) (on file with author).
153. Draft Minutes of October, 1993 BISAC Meeting 4 (Oct. 1993) (on file with author).
154. Merril Eisenbud, Summary BISAC Actions 1 (Oct. 14, 1991) (on file with author).
155. BISAC, Minutes of Meeting 2 (Apr. 18, 1991) (on file with author).
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five-year strategic plan projected that the company would support Dr.
Saltini’s research at a level of thirty thousand dollars per year for the next
three years. 156 In a letter soliciting monetary support for BISAC from
other companies manufacturing and using beryllium, Brush Wellman’s
vice-president for environmental and governmental affairs noted BISAC’s
role in sponsoring Dr. Saltini’s research and stressed that it “should lead to
tests which will allow pre-screening of people who are sensitive to
beryllium.” 157
As Dr. Saltini’s work continued to show promising results, BISAC
invited him to attend the committee’s April 1993 meeting along with
representatives from labor unions, DOE, EPA, OSHA, and other beryllium
companies. 158 At the meeting, a labor representative expressed “concern
about the confidentiality aspects of genetic information and the potential
for abuse of the data generated.” 159 Labor would “be cautious in agreeing
to its use for screening purposes.” 160 At a subsequent meeting, however,
the BISAC members agreed that “attempts to stop scientific research for
fear of its misuse at some later date were inappropriate as well as
unrealistic.” 161 The group congratulated itself for providing the “seed
money” that stimulated research programs on this topic by Dr. Saltini and
Dr. Rossman of the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center. 162
Unfortunately, neither scientist succeeded in identifying a “magic bullet”
gene indicating increased susceptibility to CBD, and by late 1996, Dr.
Eisenbud urged Brush Wellman to abandon that line of work. 163 At a
January 1999 meeting, BISAC concluded that “[e]thical and legal questions
involving confidentiality versus medical consideration of disease
prevention leave no clear course of action to be taken at this time.” 164
3. Attacking the Science on Carcinogenicity
A Health, Safety, and Environmental Strategic Plan presented to the

156. Robert Rozek, Brush Wellman Inc. Health, Safety and Environmental Strategic Plan
4, Tab 5(d), p. 4 (June 25, 1991) (on file with author).
157. Letter from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Unidentified
Recipient (July 8, 1992) (on file with author).
158. Draft Minutes of BISAC Meeting, Attachment (April 7, 1993) (on file with author).
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Draft Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (July 8, 1993) (on file with author).
162. Id. at 2.
163. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. to Daniel A.
Skoch, Vice President, Brush Wellman Inc. (Dec. 5, 1996) (on file with author).
164. Minutes of BISAC Meeting, Revised Draft 3 (Jan. 28-29, 1999) (on file with
author).

MCGARITY_CHRISTENSEN

122

2/3/2011 10:24 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

Brush Wellman Board of Directors on June 25, 1991 outlined strategies for
dealing with anticipated new scientific information on beryllium’s toxicity,
one of which was to “[c]hallenge unscientific or unreasonable regulations,
studies or other government actions.” 165 Among other things, Brush
Wellman would dispute the upcoming revised NIOSH cancer study,
challenge an anticipated air quality carcinogen standard by the Mine Safety
and Health Administration, challenge EPA’s upcoming drinking water
standard for beryllium, and challenge an upcoming EPA quantitative risk
assessment. 166
The updated NIOSH study, now under the supervision of Dr. Elizabeth
Ward and Dr. Andrea Okun, reaffirmed Dr. Wagoner’s earlier conclusion
that workplace exposure to beryllium caused cancer in human beings.167
At its July 11, 1991 meeting, the BISAC reviewed the still unpublished
Ward & Okun study and concluded that it “provided no basis for
identifying beryllium as a carcinogen.” 168 Dr. MacMahon agreed to
prepare a statement to that effect.169 The committee also suggested that the
industry should suggest that “an international panel of beryllium experts be
convened to address all pertinent beryllium health issues.” 170
A week later, Brush Wellman’s President and CEO, Gordon D. Harnett,
issued an ultimatum to Dr. J. Donald Millar, the head of NIOSH. 171
According to Harnett, Brush Wellman had reanalyzed the new Ward &
Okun data and concluded that “when appropriately adjusted for smoking
and geographic location,” the results “retain no statistical significance.”172
Harnett demanded that NIOSH give the company “adequate advance notice
of the publication journal” so that Brush Wellman could “contact the editor
and request publication of our rebuttal in the same issue.”173 The CEO
warned that the dispute over the revised study was “fast approaching a
situation painfully reminiscent of that of the late 1970’s with its
acrimonious public debate over the scientific objectivity and competence of
NIOSH studies,” 174 a debate, it will be recalled, that was generated

165. See Rozek, supra note 156, at 4, Tab 5(b).
166. Id.
167. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (July 11, 1991) (on file with author).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Letter from Gordon H. Harnett, President, CEO, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Dr. J.
Donald Millar, Dir., Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health 1 (July 18, 1991) (on file
with author).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id.
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primarily by Brush Wellman consultants now sitting on BISAC. Brush
Wellman did not need to remind NIOSH that the outcome of that debate
was that OSHA put aside its proposed workplace standard and that NIOSH
backed away from the earlier conclusions of its scientists. Brush
Wellman’s CEO now warned NIOSH that publication of the Ward & Okun
conclusions, “with no more scientific support than is in the study, would be
difficult to explain short of a malicious effort to harm the industry.” 175
By October 1991, a study conducted by Dr. Kyle Steenland concluding
that beryllium caused cancer in workers had been published in the Journal
of the National Cancer Institute. 176 In an April 1992 communication to
BISAC, Harnett stated that “the ‘cancer cloud’ that hung over the company
was a very serious problem” and that he “hoped the Committee would soon
see its way clear to address it.” 177 This overture was consistent with the
company’s desire to “[d]evelop a long-term strategy through BISAC which
will place the cancer issue in proper perspective.” 178
The “cancer cloud” darkened somewhat when Dr. Rogers reported to
BISAC that a recent study showing that airborne beryllium caused lung
cancer in rats had, in her view, been adequately conducted. 179 Although
Brush Wellman had taken the position in the OSHA hearings and
elsewhere that the older animal studies were of unacceptable quality, Dr.
Rogers asserted that “these studies had to be seriously regarded.” 180 By
July, however, the committee had come up with a response to the animal
studies. Rather than “debate whether beryllium is or is not an animal
carcinogen,” it was determined that the industry should demand that “the
question be addressed on a material by material basis, i.e., ore, soluble
salts, compounds, alloys, metal, etc., and examine the relevance of each to
human cancer.” 181 This strategy had the virtue of putting the burden on the
government to test each of the materials in laboratory animals or explain
why the results of tests of one form of beryllium were relevant to human
exposures to a different form. The committee recommended that a seminar
be convened to examine the relevance of animal tests to human beings and

175. Id.
176. Kyle Steenland & Elizabeth Ward, Lung Cancer Incidence Among Patients with
Beryllium Disease: A Cohort Morality Study, 83 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1380, 1380-85
(1991).
177. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 2 (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with the author).
178. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Bob
Rozek, Vice President, Brush Wellman Inc., re: Environmental and Governmental Affairs 2
(June 19, 1992) (on file with author).
179. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 4 (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with the author).
180. Id.
181. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 7 (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with author).

MCGARITY_CHRISTENSEN

124

2/3/2011 10:24 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

related matters.182
Another discouraging development for the industry was the decision by
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to review its
monograph on metals at its February 1993 meeting. 183 IARC was an
agency of the World Health Organization (WHO), the primary healthoriented research arm of the United Nations, and its monographs were
highly influential with regulatory bodies and private standard-setting
agencies throughout the world. 184 Brush Wellman, however, considered
IARC to be an “enemy” of industry. 185 The current monograph for metals
characterized beryllium as a “Class IIA probable human carcinogen,” but
there was a significant likelihood that IARC would upgrade that
classification to “Class I known human carcinogen,”186 and this could spell
disaster for the industry.
IARC had invited Euromateaux, a European trade association, to send a
participant to the meeting, and Euromateaux had in turn agreed to allow
Brush Wellman to select that participant.187 Understanding that the IARC
meeting was “extremely important to the beryllium industry” and that the
focus of the meeting was likely to be on the epidemiological studies,
BISAC concluded that it would be best to specify BISAC member Dr.
Brian MacMahon as the industry representative. 188 Dr. MacMahon agreed
to have his name put forward, “with the caveat that if health or other
considerations dictated, he would withdraw from the commitment.”189
Euromateaux then recommended Dr. MacMahon for the position.190
As it happened, Dr. MacMahon could not make the IARC meeting, and
Dr. Kotin attended in his stead. 191 As predicted, “the ultimate classification
of beryllium was virtually entirely dependent on epidemiological
considerations.” 192 Dr. Kotin was incensed with what he believed to be
182. Id. at 7.
183. Memorandum from Linda Duffy to Joel Moskowitz et al., re: January 22 BCDA
Meeting Trip Report 2-3 (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file with author).
184. International Agency for Research on Cancer, http://www.iarc.fr (last visited Apr.
12, 2006).
185. Memorandum from Linda Duffy to Joel Moskowitz et al., supra note 183, at 2.
186. Id. at 3.
187. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 7 (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with the author).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Memorandum from Arlette Shagarofsky-Tummers to Members of the Dangerous
Substances and Dangerous Preparations Coordination Groups et al. (Aug. 3, 1992) (on file
with author).
191. Memorandum from Dr. Paul Kotin to Martin B. Powers, Executive Sec’y, BISAC 1
(Mar. 1, 1993) (on file with author).
192. Id.
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“the obvious ‘a priori’ commitment of Dr. Carl Shy, as Chairman of the
Epidemiology Subgroup to use whatever methods necessary that would
result in beryllium being placed in IARC Group I.” 193 Kotin believed that
“Dr. Shy behaved egregiously as chairman by his obvious partiality to
Group I status for beryllium in both his comments and meeting
deportment.” 194 Dr. Shy had written the first draft of the IARC
epidemiology document with the help of Dr. Steenland, his colleague at the
University of North Carolina, and author of the most recent
epidemiological study, and he defended it throughout. Dr. Kotin later
admitted that his own input had “an element of industry advocacy,” 195 but
it was to no avail. A majority of the IARC group voted to elevate
beryllium to Class I status. 196
Concerned that the Ward & Okun and Steenland papers might soon be
used for regulatory purposes, Dr. MacMahon told BISAC that he would
redouble his efforts to prepare a review article critiquing those studies and
the earlier NIOSH studies. 197 He completed his paper five months later,
and it was accepted for publication in the Journal of Occupational
Medicine. 198 The article concluded that “the small and inconsistent excess
of lung cancer deaths in employees of one or two plants seen in [the Ward
& Okun and Steenland] studies are compatible with a number of
explanations other than that they are attributable to occupational exposure
to beryllium.” 199 Indeed, it stated that “confounding by cigarette smoking
is a more likely explanation of the lung cancer excess than is occupational
exposure to beryllium compounds.” 200 Dr. Kotin wrote a lead editorial for
the issue strongly supporting Dr. MacMahon’s assessment. 201 Dr. Kotin
complained that government agencies had in the past used “unconfirmed or
noncritically reviewed data” in promulgating regulations, and he argued

193. Id.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Roe, Thought Control, supra note 127, at A1.
196. Memorandum from Dr. Paul Kotin to Martin B. Powers, Executive Sec’y, BISAC,
supra note 191, at 3.
197. Minutes of BISAC Meeting 1 (Apr. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
198. Letter to Elizabeth Popper from Dr. Brian MacMahon, Prof. of Epidemiology, Harv.
Univ. (Sept. 23, 1993) (on file with author). The paper acknowledged that it had been
written at the request, and through funding from BISAC, which he characterized as “an
independent committee supported by the Brush Wellman and NGK Metals Companies.”
Brian MacMahon, The Epidemiologic Evidence on the Carcinogenicity of Beryllium in
Humans, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 15, 15 (1994).
199. MacMahon, supra note 198, at 15.
200. Id.
201. Paul Kotin, Re: The Epidemiological Evidence on the Carcinogenicity of Beryllium,
by MacMahon, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 25, 25 (1994).
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that the statutory “prudence” requirement that ordinarily applied to
regulatory agencies did “not eliminate the requirement for validity of the
data on which actions are based.” 202 Despite the fact that the IARC panel
and the peer reviewers for the journals in which they were published had
accepted the Ward & Okun and Steenland studies, the unspoken
implication of Dr. Kotin’s editorial was that it would be inappropriate for
OSHA or EPA to rely on those studies in light of Dr. MacMahon’s
conclusion that they were flawed.
As discussed in connection with BISAC’s consideration of LTT
screening, the international conference that BISAC envisioned for that
issue had by January 1993 been co-opted to some extent by the NIEHS,
which had insisted that the second day of the conference be devoted to
beryllium’s carcinogenicity. 203 Although BISAC had decided not to cosponsor the conference, it remained very concerned with the content of the
second day’s presentations. 204 In a November 1, 1993 letter to NIOSH,
BISAC committee chairman Merril Eisenbud complained that NIEHS had
“not budged from its plan to include only two interrelated papers” (the
Ward & Okun and Steenland papers) in the session devoted to the cancer
epidemiological studies. 205 In particular, the session would apparently not
include an independent presentation of Dr. MacMahon’s article.206
Eisenbud accused NIOSH of attempting to “perpetuate the adversarial
positions on the subject of the human carcinogenicity of beryllium that
have existed for many years, and with which the conference would have
been in a position to deal in a constructive way.” 207
In 1994, Brush Wellman decided to undertake some empirical work of
its own, not on the cancer histories of its workers, but on the history of the
Lorain, Ohio plant from which Drs. Ward and Okun and Steenland had
gathered their data. 208 Dr. Dimitrious Trichopoulos, a Harvard School of
Public Health epidemiologist who replaced Dr. MacMahon on BISAC in
January of 1994, suggested that the excess cancers at the Loraine plant
might be explained by some factor unique to the processes that were
employed at that plant.209 This would be good news for Brush Wellman,
202. Id.
203. Letter from Dr. Merril Eisenbud, Chairman, BIASC to Dr. C.W. Jameson, Nat’l Inst.
of Envtl. Health Sci. 1 (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with author).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2.
207. Id.
208. Letter from Dr. Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Prof., Harvard Sch. of Public Health to
Mark Kolanz, Director EH&S, Brush Wellman, Inc. 4 (June 24, 1999) (on file with author).
209. Id.
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because the Lorain plant had operated only from 1936 to 1948, when it was
destroyed by fire. 210 If the cause of the cancer was uniquely related to a
process employed at the abandoned Lorain plant, and if more recently
constructed plants did not employ that process, then Brush might still be
subject to a few workers compensation claims, but it would not have to
worry about tightening exposure standards beyond the historical 2.0 µg/m3
standard at its current plants. 211 It could also avoid future liability to
workers at plants using Brush Wellman’s finished beryllium and to
consumers claiming that they had contracted cancer from products
containing beryllium. 212
Brush Wellman asked a retired engineer and a retired metallurgist, both
of whom had helped design and run the Lorain plant, to examine the
possibility that the workers at the Lorain plant were exposed to some
substance that was unique to that plant.213 They soon reported back that
the gas-fired rotary kiln used at the Lorain plant would have emitted
sulfuric acid mists and that one of them had spoken to a friend who
believed that the kiln would have been “a perfect acid-mist generator.”214
This was useful to Brush Wellman for two reasons: (1) sulfuric acid mist
exposures had been associated with lung cancer in past epidemiological
studies, and (2) none of the other more recently constructed beryllium
plants used acid-fired rotary kilns. 215 In other words, this seemed to be
precisely the sort of unique process that Dr. Trichopoulos had hoped to
find.
In a memo to the BISAC, Brush Wellman’s vice-president for
governmental and environmental affairs suggested three projects.216 First,
Dr. Trichopoulos should provide a preliminary opinion as to whether the
sulfuric acid mist theory was “plausible.” 217 Second, the committee should
review the IARC monograph on magenta, which had employed a process
theory similar to Dr. Trichopoulos’ suggestion, to “look for clues as to how
Third, BISAC should “have a
the arguments were framed.” 218

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Dr.
Merril Eisenbud, Prof. of Envtl. Med., New York Univ. et al., re: What Was Unique About
the Processing of Beryllium Materials in the Brush-Lorain Plant? 1 (Jan. 31, 1994) (on file
with author).
214. Id. at 2.
215

Id.

216. Id. at 3.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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knowledgeable chemical engineer model and analyze the Lorain
calcinations process, looking for support of the opinion” of the two retired
employees. 219 Brush Wellman hoped that this preliminary work could be
completed and conveyed to a NIOSH group at a March meeting that was to
be devoted to discussing whether workers at beryllium plants should be
notified about the cancer risks they faced. 220 Although Brush Wellman did
not “expect to change [the NIOSH group’s] minds on their study results, it
will hopefully create some doubt.” 221
At the NIOSH meeting, Drs. Kotin and Trichopoulos placed the new
theory front and center, stressing that the “[t]he data clearly pointed to the
uniqueness of the Lorain Plant” and that the “excess of cancer” detected in
the Ward & Okun and Steenland studies “clearly had the fingerprint of
cancer caused by acid mist.” 222 Consequently, any notification to workers
concerning cancer risks “should be directed only to that population.”223
Not surprisingly, representatives of NIOSH and organized labor disagreed.
NIOSH “rejected the notion that acid mists were a plausible explanation of
the cancer excess,” and it stressed that the absence of excess cancer at the
more recently constructed facilities was more likely attributable to the long
latency period between exposure and onset of cancer.224 In the end,
however, the participants “reached a compromise that was probably better
than [the industry representatives] expected.” 225 The notification letter to
employees would include specific information about individual facilities
and “note the disagreement among scientists about the carcinogenicity of
beryllium.” 226 Thus, the uncertainty that BISAC manufactured found its
way into the NIOSH communication to the workers at Brush Wellman’s
plants.
The Brush Wellman effort to focus attention on acid mists continued in
1995 when it assembled a team of engineers to “reconstruct the Lorain
Plant, the processes, the products, the throughput, and the conditions that
existed in that plant during its life.” 227 This paper exercise was completed

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Memorandum from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Bob
Rozek, Brush Wellman, Inc., re: NIOSH worker Notification Meeting 1 (Mar. 14, 1994) (on
file with author).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Letter from Hugh D. Hanes, Vice President, Brush Wellman, Inc. to Dr. Dimitrious
Trichopoulos, Chairman, Harvard Sch. of Public Med. 1 (Apr. 18, 1995).
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in April, and it “paint[ed] a picture of a plant that had ventilation that was
barely adequate to control the acid fumes to the level of tolerance of the
employees, but sufficiently inadequate to cause the employees to avoid the
sulfating mill, if at all possible.” 228 Brush Wellman then sought guidance
from Dr. Trichopoulos “as to the information you feel would be necessary
to back up your story.” 229 Brush’s vice-president for governmental and
environmental affairs believed that there was “ample evidence to
differentiate the processes in the Lorain Plant,” and he hoped that Dr.
Trichopoulos would “find this information as exciting as we do.” 230
At a subsequent BISAC meeting, Dr. Trichopoulos reported that he had
evaluated the engineering report and concluded that the sulfuric acid levels
suggested in the report were too high for human endurance.231 He made
some slightly different assumptions and “drafted a summary for Brush
review and concurrence.” 232 At BISAC’s January 1996 meeting, Dr.
Trichopoulos noted that the conclusions of IARC and NIOSH would be
“extremely difficult to change, given the normal human tendency to
perpetuate error rather than admit to it.” 233 The acid mist paper, however,
would give “everyone a chance to correct the error without losing face if
they were willing to do so.” 234 The committee agreed that the paper was of
sufficient importance that it should be sent to the Journal of Occupational
and Environmental Medicine “with the entire BISAC listed as authors.” 235
Things progressed precisely as planned, and the acid mist paper was
published in the March 1997 issue of that publication. 236 The article began
with a description of the IARC program for evaluating carcinogenicity in
humans and the 1992 IARC evaluation of beryllium. 237 It then related Dr.
MacMahon’s earlier review article citing “serious defects in the
methodology of the early epidemiologic studies” and questioning “the
interpretation of the more recent, and generally better grounded,
epidemiologic studies.” 238 Noting that “[s]ulfuric acid mist and vapors are

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Minutes of BISAC Meeting 4 (Oct. 9-10, 1995) (on file with author).
Id.
Minutes of BISAC Meeting 5 (May 20, 1996) (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
Haberman & Pratt et al., Is Beryllium Carcinogenic in Humans?, 39 J OCCUP.
ENVTL. MED. 205, 205-08 (1997) (written by the members of BISAC).
237. Id. at 205.
238. Haberman & Pratt, et al., Is Beyrillium Carcinogenic In Humans?, supra note 236,
at 205.
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established lung carcinogens in humans,” the paper concluded that “the
process and circumstances at the Lorain plant were probably carcinogenic
to humans” and that the “apparent effect of ‘beryllium and beryllium
compounds’ was the result of exposure to sulfuric acid mist and vapors that
acted as typical confounding variables.” 239
H. The Government Takes a Modest Step
One of the goals of Brush Wellman’s 1991 five-year plan was to “insure
that the Company is protected, through competent defense, from
unwarranted legal and regulatory actions related to [environmental health
and safety] issues.” 240 To meet that goal in the regulatory arena, the
company would “[e]mploy legal means to defeat unreasonably restrictive
occupational and emission standards and to challenge rulemaking and other
regulatory activities that seek to impose unreasonable or unwarranted
changes.” 241 Apparently any change from the existing forty year-old
occupational standard of 2.0 µg/m3 was deemed by the company to be
“unreasonable” because another 1991 goal was to “[r]esist an attempt to
make the existing occupational exposure standard of 2 micrograms/cubic
meter, as measured and calculated by Brush, more restrictive.”242 With the
help of BISAC, the company succeeded in forestalling regulation for the
better part of a decade.
During the latter half of the Clinton Administration, however, the DOE
decided that it had an obligation to protect workers at DOE-related
facilities even if there were some scientific uncertainties about the need to
take any particular action.243 On December 8, 1999, DOE issued a rule
applicable to workers at facilities managed by DOE and its contractors
mandating a ten-fold reduction in the acceptable workplace exposure to
beryllium. 244 In 1998, OSHA added to its regulatory agenda a new project
under which it would consider whether to require that companies in the
private sector implement the same protections, 245 but the project was not
completed during the remainder of the Clinton Administration. 246 In 2002,

239. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
240. Rozek, supra note 156, at 1, Tab 5(f).
241. Id. at 2, Tab 5(f).
242. Id.
243. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98.
244. Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,854, 68,862 (Dec.
8, 1999).
245. Occupational Exposure to Beryllium; Request for Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,707,
70,709 (Nov. 26, 2002).
246. Michaels, supra note 11, at 98.
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the Bush Administration announced that OSHA would not propose a
beryllium standard until further research had been completed, and it
requested public comment on fifty-two questions that it thought would be
relevant to its decision whether or not to go forward with a rulemaking
effort. 247 The agency has taken no formal action since that time.
III. BLUE RIBBON PANELS AND SOUND REGULATORY DECISION
MAKING.
Brush Wellmon’s decision to appoint a “blue ribbon panel” of carefully
chosen experts is a frequently relied upon industry response to the
publication of an adverse scientific report or a worrisome regulatory
development. If there was an unusual aspect to BISAC, it was its
longevity. Because it is expensive to assemble several busy experts at a
commodious location, pay them consultant fees or honoraria for their
efforts, and provide staffing for the meetings and reports, most blue ribbon
panels are assembled for a specific regulatory need and dismissed as soon
as that task has been completed. If, however, an industry’s products or
activities are likely to prove controversial on a continuing basis, it can
assemble a permanent panel of experts to provide advice to the industry
and relevant regulatory agencies as the beryllium industry did with BISAC.
The cosmetics industry in 1976 created a similar quasi-permanent panel
of seven experts called the Expert Panel for Cosmetic Ingredient Review
(CIR) to address post-market studies indicating that cosmetics might be
dangerous. CIR was then available to address a controversy that erupted in
2002 over the use of phthalates in nail polishes, shampoos, fragrances and
similar products after laboratory animal research suggested that many
phthalates can cause birth defects.248 The CIR unanimously concluded that
phthalates were “safe for use in cosmetic products in present practices of
use and concentration.” 249 Coming just twelve days after the European
Commission (EU) ordered companies to remove two phthalates from
cosmetics sold in EU countries, 250 an industry spokesperson declared the
CIR finding to be a “triumph for science-based evidence over scare
tactics.” 251

247. Occupational Exposure to Beyryllium; Request for Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 70,
709.
248. Jim Morris, FDA Scrutinizing Family of Chemicals, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June
17, 2002, at A1; Brian Reid, Beauty Coverage?, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at F1.
249. Glenn Hess, CIR Panel Finds Phthalates Safe for Cosmetics Applications, 262
CHEMICAL MARKET REP. 1, 1 (2002).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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The primary advantage of the blue ribbon panel to the government is its
capacity to bring scientific expertise to bear on policy-relevant scientific
issues. As discussed above, government agencies often find the considered
judgment of a group of prominent scientists helpful in determining the
reliability and quality of scientific studies. Blue ribbon panels also perform
the perhaps less legitimate function of deflecting public criticism from
agencies that are forced to make tough decisions. As Professor Wendy
Wagner has demonstrated, agencies are all too willing in such situations to
engage in a “science charade,” through which they mask controversial
policy decisions in the veneer of science and thereby avoid accountability
for their policy choices.252 Privately arranged blue ribbon panels can
provide the same scientific input and political cover at no cost to the
government.
The usefulness of a privately assembled blue ribbon panel to the
government is less clear when the relevant agency has already initiated a
scientific review procedure. For example, while EPA’s Science Advisory
Board was reviewing a draft of a staff-prepared assessment of the health
risks posed by exposure to the Teflon precursor PFOA, 253 the industryfunded American Council on Science and Health (ACSH) hastily
assembled a blue ribbon panel composed of an entirely different group of
scientists. That panel produced a booklet and accompanying press release,
based upon an industry-prepared position paper that was “peer reviewed”
by scientists likewise chosen by ACSH. 254 The ACSH panel concluded
that PFOA posed “no likely risk” to humans in the “trace amounts” found
in human blood. 255 The resort to a press release, however, suggests that the
panel’s purpose had less to do with providing an objective scientific
assessment to the agency than with preempting the contribution of the
experts that the agency had already assembled.
From the perspective of a regulated entity, the blue ribbon panel has the
great virtue of lending scientific legitimacy to what would otherwise be
viewed as mere advocacy. The views of company scientists will
predictably be dismissed as biased by participants who disagree with the
company’s position on the regulatory issues, and they are likely to be
252. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 1, at 1640.
253. See EPA, OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, DRAFT RISK ASSESSMENT OF
THE POTENTIAL HUMAN
HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO
PERFLUOROOCTANOIC
ACID
AND
ITS
SALTS
(2005),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/pfoa/pfoaex.pdf.
254. Teflon-Production Chemical Does Not Pose Health Risk to General Population,
Science Panel Finds, MED. NEWS TODAY, Mar. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=21512.
255. Id.
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discounted by the agency for the same reason. Agency officials may
legitimately suspect that company scientists are not entirely free to express
their scientific judgment when it leads to conclusions that run counter to
the company’s economic well-being. The views of the distinguished
scientists that make up a blue ribbon panel are less easily dismissed,
because they typically have a degree of financial independence and are
presumably less likely to risk damage to their reputations in the pursuit of a
single company’s economic interests.
As the BISAC and CIR examples suggest, the privately sponsored blue
ribbon panel is an especially useful device for “deconstructing” one or
more scientific studies that could, if relied upon by regulatory authorities,
threaten the economic well-being of a company or industry. If, as is
typically the case, the blue ribbon panel includes prominent scientists with
established reputations in the relevant field, their criticisms of work
undertaken by government scientists or less well-established scientists can
carry a great deal of weight both in the scientific community and, more
importantly, among high level regulatory decision makers. For example, in
the mid-1990s, a consultant to the chlorine industry assembled a group of
eighteen scientists at a commodious location to evaluate a nine-volume
draft EPA assessment of the human health risks of dioxin. 256 The meeting
resulted in a letter signed by all of the assembled scientists and published in
Science expressing serious reservations about the quality of the science
underlying the risk assessment. 257 Although one of the participants later
acknowledged that the consulting company may not have been “unbiased
in the choice of individuals it . . . brought together” to evaluate the risk
assessment, 258 high level agency officials sent the draft back to the drawing
board where it remained for another six years until the agency issued a
“revised draft” for review.
The blue ribbon panel can also prove useful in an industry’s broader
attempts to influence pubic opinion. An effective public relations
campaign may generate pressure on a regulatory agency against taking
“precipitous” action, and it may also be necessary for more mundane
marketing purposes when a company’s product comes under attack. As the
phthalates example suggests, a rapid scientific rebuttal to a study indicating
that a product poses risks to human health may be required to restore

256. Dioxin and the EPA: The Science and Politics of Regulation, ENVTL. REV.
NEWSLETTER
(Envtl.
Rev.,
Seattle,
WA),
May
1995,
available
at
http://www.environmentalreview.org/vol02/mattison.html; Richard Stone, Dioxin Report
Faces Scientific Gauntlet, 265 SCIENCE 1650, 1650 (1994).
257. Dioxin and the EPA: The Science and Politics of Regulation, supra note 256.
258. Id.
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shaken consumer confidence in the product. It is therefore not surprising
that public relations firms are frequently involved in assembling and
managing blue ribbon panels. The public relations people use the blue
ribbon panel to “manufacture uncertainty” about the validity of the
damaging studies. In the messy world of regulatory science where
perfection is impossible, the scientists on the blue ribbon panel can be
relied upon to identify one or more aspects of virtually any study that could
stand improvement. The public relations professionals then take over to
characterize the study as “fatally flawed” and therefore unworthy of serious
consideration by consumers, agencies and courts.
For example, in the early 1990s, the EPA prepared a risk assessment on
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and presented it to the agency’s
Science Advisory Board for review. 259 Although EPA lacked any
regulatory authority on its own to regulate indoor air quality, the tobacco
industry recognized that the document posed a serious threat to the vitality
of the industry if the public became convinced that secondhand smoke
caused lung cancer. 260 RJR Tobacco Company therefore hired a consultant
to assemble a “shadow committee” of “independent scientists,” formally
called the “EPA Health Assessment Review Committee,” to evaluate
EPA’s risk assessment and be available at the behest of the company’s
public relations department to discuss relevant issues at regulatory,
administrative, legislative, and other public forums. 261 The committee
prepared a lengthy critique of the EPA document, concluding that, “EPA’s
classification of ETS as a Group A carcinogen is scientifically not
justifiable.” 262
Professor Neil Pierce notes that a company’s selection “of a few
scientists who are hypercritical of others’ work can result in massive
pressure on public health decision makers” that is “particularly effective
since it apparently comes from independent scientists.” 263 Thus, the
industry-funded Marshall Institute convened a panel of experts, drawn
259. EPA, OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992), available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=2835.
260. Thomas O. McGarity, On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk
Assessment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 200 (2003).
261. C.R. Green, ETS Division Weekly Highlights 1 (Jan. 29, 1991) (on file with author);
C.R. Green, ETS Division Weekly Highlights 2 (Jan. 22, 1991) (on file with author); Letter
from G. Robert DiMarco to Alfred T. Wehner 1 (Nov. 9, 1990) (on file with author); RJR,
ETS 1 (Draft, Jan. 24, 1991) (on file with author).
262. Biomedical & Envtl. Consultants, Inc., Critiques of EPA External Review Draft
600/6/90/006A, May 1990: Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer
in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children xv (Feb. 1991) (on file with author).
263. PEARCE, supra note 7, at 71.
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almost exclusively from the diminishing ranks of climate change critics, to
evaluate a report by the 2,500 member International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The Marshall Institute panel’s report, which predictably
criticized the IPCC for “failing to convey the underlying uncertainties that
are important in policy considerations,”264 was then relied upon by Senator
James Inhofe to support his intense criticism of scientists who advocate
taking action to reduce greenhouse gasses. 265
As Professor Pierce suggests, the primary danger of the industryappointed blue ribbon panel to the integrity of the regulatory decisionmaking process is it obvious potential for bias. The company that convenes
the panel can choose its members, and it is likely to consider past
statements, publications and other indicia of a member’s policy
predilections in going about that task. Even if every invited scientist is not
dependably in the sponsor’s camp, the sponsor knows that, as a practical
matter, “whoever drafts the original document effectively controls the
message.” 266 The important thing, therefore, is to ensure that the
chairperson and a solid majority of the members of the committee are
likely to support the sponsor’s position.
There is certainly evidence that blue ribbon panels do not always adopt a
wholly neutral approach to the scientific evidence. For example, when the
reproductive toxicity of low-level exposures to the ubiquitous plasticizer
Bisphenol A (BPA) threatened its continued use, the plastics industry hired
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis to assemble a scientific panel to
address that question. 267 While acknowledging that several studies had
reported adverse reproductive effects in laboratory animals, the panel found
no “consistent affirmative evidence of low-dose BPA effects.” 268 Critics
pointed out, however, that the panel reviewed seven of the nine industryfunded studies (all of which found no adverse effects) and only twelve of
the thirty-eight available government-funded studies (nearly all of which
identified some adverse effect at low levels). 269 Similarly, in response to
the publication of the first paper detailing the serious side effects of the
sleeping pill Halcion in The Lancet, the pill’s manufacturer convened a

264. Report Questions Role of Greenhouse Gases, Criticizes Conclusions of International
Panel, BNA ENV’T REP., Mar. 8, 2002, at 531.
265. ROSS GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT 55 (2004).
266. DAVID HEALY, LET THEM EAT PROZAC 115 (2004).
267. Kara Sissel, Study Dismisses Bisphenol-A as Endocrine Discruper, CHEMICAL
WEEK, Sept. 8, 2004, at 28.
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group of sleep researchers who sent a letter to the journal denouncing the
study. 270 The chairperson of the group later acknowledged that he and the
other researchers had been mislead by company representatives.271
After the manufacturer of the asthma drug fenoterol sharply criticized an
epidemiological study published in The Lancet concluding that the drug
caused increased mortality in asthmatics, the author conducted a second
study to meet the manufacturer’s objections. 272 When the second study
reached the same conclusion, the manufacturer convened a group of
carefully chosen experts at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills,
California to evaluate the second study’s conclusions.273 Working “under
some pressure” from the company’s public relations representative, the
group concluded that the second study avoided only one of the
methodologic problems of the first study, but had “retained others and
introduced new methodologic problems.” 274 An independent review of the
second study convened by the FDA, however, concluded that both studies
supported the conclusion that fenoterol caused increased mortality, and the
agency ultimately took steps to minimize the use of the drug. 275
An industry can deflect allegations that a blue ribbon panel was “hand
picked” by contracting with an outside organization that will reliably
assemble a group that is dominated by scientists of the right persuasion.
For example, after EPA proposed the establishment of a stringent standard
for chloroform in drinking water, the chlorine industry arranged with the
International Life Science’s Institute, an industry-supported think tank, to
assemble a blue ribbon panel to evaluate the carcinogenic risks of
chloroform. 276 The panel disagreed with EPA’s zero parts per billion
maximum contaminant level goal for chloroform in drinking water and
suggested a much less stringent goal of three hundred parts per billion.277
Similarly, the American Council for Science and Health, at the behest of
the plastics industry, convened a “blue ribbon panel” headed by former
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to evaluate the health risks and benefits
of the plasticizer DEHP, a common component of medical devices.278 The
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panel concluded that DEHP was not harmful to human health and that
banning it from medical devices would pose a significant health risk to
people in need of those devices. 279
IV. CONCLUSION
The numerous examples of privately commissioned blue ribbon panels
reaching conclusions consistent with the sponsoring entity’s position, and
the dearth of examples of such panels reaching conclusions that undermine
the sponsoring entity’s position (the author has not located a single one,
though it is entirely possible that one or more examples do exist), probably
explains why regulated industries find these panels to be an effective, if
expensive way to influence regulatory decision making and public
perceptions about potentially risky products and activities. From the
perspective of sound public policy, however, the critical question is
whether the value to the decision-making process of the additional
expertise and information that the blue ribbon panel makes available is
outweighed by its potential to bias regulatory decisions in the direction of
the positions of the sponsoring entities.
The easiest way for regulatory agencies to prevent bias from intruding
into the process is to ignore the output of such panels altogether. Agencies
could simply let it be known that reports from privately commissioned blue
ribbon panels are so unreliable that they are not appropriate for citation in
comments to the agency or in any agency support document. This extreme
solution, however, is unworkable as a practical matter, and generally
inconsistent with sound regulatory decision making. As a practical matter,
sponsoring entities will still assemble blue ribbon panels to influence
consumers and legislators, and an agency that adamantly refuses to
acknowledge their reports is an easy target for severe public criticism by
the sponsoring and their entities allies in think tanks and legislatures. As a
scientific matter, a wholesale “exclusionary rule” is inconsistent with the
“weight of the evidence” approach that scientists normally take toward
evaluating the reliability of scientific information.280
The better solution is for the agency itself to take a “weight of the
evidence” approach toward blue ribbon panel reports, and to discount them
sufficiently to avoid bias. Sometimes this will merely require agency
decision makers to take the blue ribbon panel’s report “with a grain of
salt.” Sometimes, as with the case of blue ribbon panels dominated by
scientists known to be on the extreme fringe of the relevant scientific issue
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(e.g., the Marshall Institute’s global warming panel), this will require the
agency to discount the panel’s predictable conclusions quite deeply.
Furthermore, when an agency cites in support of a regulatory decision the
conclusions of an outside blue ribbon panel that was supported by an entity
with an interest in the outcome of the proceedings, it should provide its
reasons for concluding that the panel’s conclusions were objective and
otherwise reliable.
Since the origin of and support for an outside blue ribbon panel will not
always be obvious to the agency (or members of the general public), the
agency should attempt to ascertain the identity of any sponsoring entity
prior to relying upon the conclusions of such panels. In the case of some
panels, like BISAC, the sponsoring entity is readily apparent. For others,
like panels convened by intermediate entities such as the International Life
Sciences Institute, identifying the real source of the panel’s support may be
difficult. In either case, full disclosure of the source of support is critical to
the agency’s evaluation of the panel’s conclusions and to the public’s
ultimate acceptance of the agency’s decisions.
Although it should be reasonably easy for a regulatory agency to identify
and discount biased input from privately sponsored blue ribbon scientific
panels, the general public may be mislead by the sophisticated public
relations campaigns that sponsoring entities and their public relations
consultants initiated. An agency may be hard-pressed to explain to the
public why it is reaching a regulatory decision that appears to depart from
the advice of a panel composed of scientists with prestigious pedigrees. A
relatively expensive way to fend off public pressure generated by a blue
ribbon panel is for the agency to appoint its own panel. As we have seen,
the regulated industries are not above generating “dueling panels” when the
stakes are sufficiently high. This solution, however, invites the agency to
engage in the same kind of biased cherry-picking exercise in assembling
the agency’s panel that the private entity no doubt used to assembling its
panel, thus inviting deserved criticism of the decision-making process for
lack of objectivity.
One might hope that the scientific community would rally in defense of
an agency that has become the target a well-financed campaign by a
regulated entity to “manufacture uncertainty” through biased blue ribbon
panels, but that is likely a vain hope. Scientists are cautious by nature and
therefore not inclined to wade into public controversies.281 While the
scientific community has on some fairly rare occasions weighed in heavily

281. Saad Z. Nagi & Ronald G. Corwin, The Research Enterprise: An Overview, in THE
SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF RESEARCH 24 (Saad Z. Nagi & Ronald G. Corwin, eds. 1972).

MCGARITY_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:24 PM

RESISTING REGULATION

139

on an issue of profound public importance like global warming, agencies
should not depend upon independent scientists to come to their defense in
run-of-the-mill disputes over the quality of scientific studies, and the proper
inferences to be drawn from those studies. The relatively mundane field of
“regulatory science” is not likely to inspire many scientists to abandon their
laboratories for the talk radio circuits.
At the end of the day, the agency may be forced to rely upon its own
ability to influence public perception and on the willingness of the
beneficiaries of the regulatory statutes it implements to come to its defense
in the public relations wars. Unlike the scientific community generally,
scientists employed by advocacy groups are willing and able to speak out
on scientific issues that arise in regulatory contexts, and they are usually
adept at attracting the attention of the news media. Although public
interest groups lack the resources to assemble blue ribbon panels to
deliberate at length and write reports, they can generate letters to agencies
and congresspersons and ask prominent scientists to sign them. While this
may not be an adequate substitute for the reasoned deliberation of a blue
ribbon panel in the scientific community, it may prove quite persuasive in
the realm of public relations.
Blue ribbon panels assembled by governmental bodies have contributed
greatly to sound regulatory decision making. Like any policymaking tool,
however, the blue ribbon panel has both virtues and limitations. It can,
among other things, be misused by regulatory agencies to mask
policymaking behind the veneer of scientific objectivity. In the hands of
private entities with their own agendas, the blue ribbon panel concept has
fewer virtues and more limitations. Because they are expensive, private
entities will rely upon them when they feel most threatened by a scientific
development or regulatory initiative. The motivation is self-defense, and
not the advancement of scientific knowledge. Because they have such a
high potential for mischief, agencies should not encourage their use and
should view their products with a highly skeptical eye.

